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Abstract—Legacy Electronic Health Records (EHRs) systems
were not developed with the level of connectivity expected from
them nowadays. Therefore, interoperability weakness inherent
in the legacy systems can result in poor patient care and
waste of financial resources. Large hospitals are less likely to
share their data with external hospitals due to economic and
political reasons. Motivated by these facts, we aim to provide
a set of software implementation guidelines, i.e., MedShare to
deal with interoperability issues among disconnected healthcare
systems. The proposed integrated architecture includes: 1) a
data extractor to fetch legacy medical data from a hemodialysis
center, 2) converting it to a common data model, 3) indexing
patient information using the HashMap technique, and 4) a set of
services and tools that can be installed as a coherent environment
on top of stand-alone EHRs systems. Our work enabled three
cooperating but autonomous hospitals to mutually exchange
medical data and helped them develop a common reference
architecture. It lets stakeholders retain control over their patient
data, winning the trust and confidence much needed towards
a successful deployment of MedShare. Security concerns were
effectively addressed that also included patient consent in the
data exchange process. Thereby, the implemented toolset offered
a collaborative environment to share EHRs by the healthcare
providers.
Index Terms—Electronic Health Record, EHR, Privacy Pre-
serving, EHR Sharing, Medical Resource
I. INTRODUCTION
LEGACY EHRs systems have been mostly designed andimplemented to meet the internal clinical needs of health-
care providers, which have become obsolete and no longer
meet the external needs of the patients and local govern-
ments. Consequently, this impedes the way to an improved
patientcare in a networked healthcare setting, also resulting
in increased cost and clinical negligence. The future health
information systems aimed at the integration, interoperability,
innovation, and intelligence [9][26] for sharing the resource.
Exchanging medical information has seamlessly paved the
way to introducing medical standards [8][4][2] providing with
a unified approach to medical vocabulary and exchange of
information, but none of them has come of age to be used
smoothly. For example, a study [22] finds weak evidence of the
‘meaningful use program (MU)’ initiated by the 2009 Health
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Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act on EHRs uptake due to data interoperability
challenges. The study [39] presents the top ten technical issues
in healthcare, which include privacy, quantity, security, and
the implementation of electronic medical records. Moreover,
the political and economical issues and healthcare providers
of contingent factors [27] should take into an account in the
development of medical information sharing.
Large medicalcare providers seem reluctant to share their
patient cum customers data with other healthcare providers
[24]. They exchange patient information internally and are
less likely to cooperate outside their network [23]. In such
a scenario, the design and development of an interoperable
health information exchange system is a non-trivial task. This
is not only because of complex workflows involving data
acquisition, storing, communication, and manipulation, but
also lacking in a coordinated effort to connect autonomous
healthcare providers.
Albeit, in an ideal scenario healthcare networks are ex-
pected to: (a) to support direct data exchange, (b) query-
based exchange of patient-related information in an emergency
situation, medication history, radiology reports and records of
a diseased person hospitalized for emergency care, and (c)
personalized patient data management by patients themselves
like online banking. Architecting and implementing such an in-
teroperable system, meeting the aforementioned requirements,
needs a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to catering
both technical non-technical issues.
Motivated by this, the current research is focused on
connecting disintegrated healthcare providers in Macau SAR
that include three major hospitals named Hospital Conde S.
Janua´rio (HC), Kiang Wu Hospital (KW) and Macau Uni-
versity of Science and Technology Hospital (UH). However,
the theme of our work has wider implications and scope
to build health information exchange systems that confront
the same challenges. The autonomous EHRs systems under
consideration were neither developed using special instructions
or standards at the time of their birth, nor the concerned
authorities were ready to update their legacy systems. Because
the three hemodialysis centers had their fully functional and
independent electronic health records in place. Among the
three collaborating hospitals in this research, two are private
healthcare providers while the third one is public.
In the given healthcare setting, distributed information shar-
ing is mandatory for effective patient care and monitoring
where patients often opt for switching a healthcare provider
due to numerous reasons. MedShare is a simple yet robust
EHRs system to allow for exchanging medical resources for an
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Fig. 1. A High Level View of the MedShare Architecture
improved patient care between isolated hemodialysis centers
in the given scenario. The types of data shared in MedShare
includes lab reports, radiology images, transcription reports
and medication histories. MedShare works in three steps: 1)
it uses a data extractor to extract legacy data of a patient
located at a hemodialysis centers, 2) it converts the data to
a unified data format agreed upon by all the stakeholders
and medical providers belonging to three hospitals, 3) the
platform indexes the patient information using the HashMap
technique. Our approach integrates a set of services and tools
that can be installed as a coherent environment on top of
standalone EHRs. As discussed in [13], Operational Data
Model (ODM) lacks explicit support for modern exchange
mechanisms, and our authentication mechanism is based on
RESTful web services and our previous work also employs
the same techniques to exchange medical information [29].
The MedShare EHRs sharing system, as depicted in Fig. 1,
allows to handle situations such as follows:
Example: A doctor can request all the hemodialysis records
of a patient. The EHR sharing system returns a date-wise
list of all the hemodialysis records of a queried patient.
Furthermore, the doctor can access the detail of the EHRs
on a specific date. E.g., Sep 30, 2015. MedShare allows
an administrator to track the potential leaks in the system.
For example, when the tracker needs to know the accessing
information about the EHR with ID 0221, the tracking system
shows all the relevant results. Hence, MedShare facilitates
with distributed patient care but also allows to share tasks
of the hemodialysis EHRs, if required, among the Macau
hospitals without compromising patient privacy. We identify
the data exchange scenarios, capture the intent behind it and
identify collaborating entities. These and other system goals
are achieved by system components such as authentication,
EHR query, synchronization, and audit.
Contributions: This paper offers three substantive contribu-
tions. 1) We set up a reference architecture for a diverse
set of healthcare providers to connect and exchange medical
information of their patients. 2) The implemented approach
is reusable. The source code of the system is uploaded on
GitHub1, which is freely available to download, and 3) the
implementation sets forth technological guidelines for design-
ing and implementing health information exchange system.
For brevity, the remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: Section II reviews the related literature. Section III
presents data exchange scenarios from the hemodialysis cen-
ters in Macau. Section IV proposes MedShare, a medical
data resource sharing architecture. Section V shows system
prototyping and demonstration. Section VI concludes this
paper and outlines our future work.
II. A LITERATURE REVIEW
Legacy EHR systems were not developed with a certain
level of interoperability in mind. Therefore, dis-connectivity
inherent in these systems can result in their inability to
1https://github.com/yylonly/medshare
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exchange medical resources. Contrarily, numerous benefits
can be achieved by connecting legacy EHRs systems. The
authors [6] demonstrate a suggestive evidence that a shared
electronic health record can support more integrated care.
More evidence comes through quantitative analyses of the
actual contribution of shared EHR systems and is discussed in
a large case study conducted in Austria [32]. But, large-scale
adoption of such systems is impractical without addressing the
privacy and security concerns [31]. On the other hand, larger
hospital systems generally exchange electronic patient infor-
mation internally, not with other external hospitals [24]. It also
reveals that larger hospital systems tend to create ‘information
silos’, which is a data system that is incapable of reciprocal
operations with other hospital systems. The reason is if larger
hospitals allow outflow of data they are more likely to loose
patients. In such a given situation, the adaptability of open
standards for interoperable hospital systems is still far from
practice. This situation necessitates the need to engage health
informatics researchers and users for a better interconnection
among different hospitals. Another study shows that inter-
organizational data exchange is one of the most important
information system challenges [13], where it reports on the
user experiences with different regional health information
exchange systems in Finland.
A recent work [34] combines metadata registries and seman-
tic web technologies to uniquely reference, query and process
a Common Data Element (CDE) to enable the syntactic and
semantic interoperability. However, this research is limited to
the interoperability of medical vocabulary. The survey consists
of 43 techniques addressing interoperability issues. Another
study [37] provides interesting findings that 40.7% (n=1465) of
the predefined headings applied in the multi-professional EHR
system was shared by two or more professional groups and
only 1.7% (n=62) of the predefined headings were shared by
all eight groups. The study [34] creates the Portal of Medical
Data Models2 to foster sharing of medical data models. This
is achieved by a web front-end that enables users to search,
view, download and discuss data models. Some other related
work can be found in [11][36][8][33][17][4].
Numerous factors, e.g., scalability, heterogeneity, resource
management, transparency, openness, performance analysis
and synchronization contribute to the development of a de-
pendable EHR system, nonetheless, security may be consid-
ered at the core of system properties. Medical resource sharing,
if it is between cross-organization or cross-domain, a study
considers cross-domain authentication and fine-grained access
control [35]. This study discusses an on-demand revocation
if any of the two cooperating organizations are unwilling to
share data anymore. This may be seen as the flexibility to the
notion of security and privacy concerns in a networked health-
care setting. Another approach [30] uses direct messaging, a
secure e-mail-like protocol employed to allow the exchange of
encrypted health information online. The paper [15] provides
a tool supports a privacy-preserving linkage of electronic
health records (EHRs) data across multiple sites in a large
metropolitan area in the United States (Chicago, IL). Another
2https://medical-data-models.org
research [18] discusses the possibility of attacks on healthcare
systems.
Two closely related work, the first is the eMOLST
project [40], which officially supported by the New York
State Department of Health (NYS DOH) providers, handles
data interoperability through: a) authenticating access to a
shared medical resource by applying Single Sign-On (SSO)
technique, b) it employs a patient identity source system to
assign a unique identifier to a patient and requires extra work
to maintain a set of attributes associated with the patient. In
contrast, our system computes the hash code of the patient
identifies card number, uniquely representing each patient in
the EHR sharing system. eMOLST requires the new system
portal to be deployed to access the EHRs, while our system
is designed to work with EHR legacy system. Our patient
indexing component that lets hospitals keep the data by them-
selves. eMOLST needs to push the data away to a centralized
repository. The second work [7] proposed a semi-distributed
architecture NEHR to offer EHR sharing in Greece. Every
sharing request requires the authentication of the patient in
NEHR. However, our MedShare architecture provides two-
way authentication to not only need the authentication of
the patient but also require the authentication by the data
providers. Moreover, our locator service uses the de-identified
HashMap to locate the resource, which reduces the risk of
privacy breach.
For privacy requirements, a survey [33] across North
America, Asia, and Europe shows that data sharing and
data breaches are the biggest concerns for the users. More-
over, there is a comparison [20] on the effectiveness of
the methods used for anonymizing quasi-identifiers to avoid
sensitive information, and this quantitative analysis of de-
identification shows that de-identifying data provides no guar-
antee of anonymity. The study [3] elaborates on the de-
identified patient data, and [28] argues explicit validation
of healthcare security policies. [12] relates electronic health
records and patient safety. Some other works [16][19] discuss
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks to support medical data sharing.
A research [21] studies the data exchange between patients
and healthcare facilities. It further investigates the real-time
data synchronization issues. Our work also addresses synchro-
nization challenges, but no real-time data synchronization is
needed in our case.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HEMODIALYSIS CENTERS IN
MACAU
The hemodialysis centers in Macau serve a large number of
population, but they are disconnected to share medical records
of their patients. A patient, generally tends to see a doctor in a
hospital of her choice, is prescribed a hemodialysis treatment
plan at specified dates. If a patient suddenly decides to change
her hemodialysis center, the exchange of patient information
between hemodialysis centers becomes a bottleneck for the
smooth delivery of medical services.
The Macau citizens have confidence in public health sys-
tems, and they prefer to see a doctor in HC. Consequently, the
initial diagnosis records and treatment plans are produced and
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stored in HC. Nonetheless, a patient may opt to go to another
hospital, say UH, to take treatments due to unavailability of
resources and the place where they live. The hemodialysis
centers have no sharing platform in place. Therefore, it results
in carrying paper-based by the patient medical data along with
any other electronic data copies on CDs. It is noteworthy that
patient privacy is well preserved with respect to the security
of the EHR system in HC for a non-closure data agreement
exists between KW and UH.
Fig. 2. Use Case Diagram of the networked EHR System
The data-sharing problem leads to developing a hemodial-
ysis network that should address the following functional and
non-functional requirements. We use the Unified Modeling
Language3 (UML) to give a flavor of the EHR system require-
ments in Fig. 2. Some of the main functional requirements are
listed below:
– The use case of seeing a doctor describes the procedure
that a patient visits the doctor in a hospital, and the doctor
requests for the related shared EHRs of the patient from
other hospitals, if any.
– A doctor is authenticated and authorized to access a local
medical record.
– A doctor may access medical records placed at another
hospital through the same authentication service in her
working hospital.
– The patient provides her consent, and authorizes the
doctor to access her medical records. This guarantees
that in a EHR sharing session, a patient authorization
is recorded.
– The scheduler updates the local patient data in a unified
format and updates it at the indexing server. These shared
records should be regularly synchronized but not required
to be updated in real-time. Note that a hemodialysis
patient usually takes her next treatment after a specificied
time.
A. The Workflow for Resource Sharing
The high-level EHR sharing workflow is presented as fol-
lows: a patient sees a doctor in an arbitrary hospital H1 among
HC, KW and UH. The EHRs are generated and stored in the
respective legacy EHR systems of H1. A scheduler regularly
3http://www.omg.org/spec/UML/
triggers the synchronization of the extracted shared EHRs from
the legacy EHR system and updates the corresponding indexes
in the patient indexing server. Only then, the patient can see
a doctor in another hospital H2 with the access to the shared
EHRs. At the time of requesting old EHRs of the patient, the
doctor must be authorized by both the current hospital H2 and
the patient.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. The part (a) of the Figure 3 shows the self-explanatory UML
component diagram and names its elements. Part (b) shows the elements of
the sequence diagram presenting the notion of actor and calling functions.
To understand the graphical notation used in the paper, non-
familiar readers are refered to UML specification. However,
for brevity, we provide the names and functions of the used
notation in Fig. 3. Fig. 4 presents the detailed system usage
scenario of the communication taking place between actors
and the EHR sharing system. We use the standard sequence
diagram from UML that allows to graphically depict how your
system could potentially be interacted with. Considering the
proposed architecture, Fig. 4 describes the detailed activities
beyond the system architecture. A doctor of HC is authorized
through the service in her working hospital (Please refer to
Steps 1, 2, 3, 4 in the diagram), and then the doctor runs
the EHR queries on a patient data (Step 5). The patient then
authorizes this request by scanning her ID card (Step 6, 7,
8, 9, 10). This two-way authentication by the patient and
the hospital satisfies the required privacy requirements. The
request can then be sent to the data center (Step 11). If the
patient data is distributed over multiple locations (e.g. KW
and UH), the relevant indexes are retrieved by the query (Step
13). Afterwards, the transmission requests will be sent out to
those hospitals (Step 14). Once the data transfer (Step 16)
is completed in EHR sharing client of HC, the requested
EHRs are displayed to the doctor (Step 17). Moreover, the
transactions are recorded in the log database for post-event
analysis (Step 12, 15). This is important in case of a privacy
and security breach. If the patient has EHRs in more than one
hospital, the operations (Step 14, 15, 16) will be run in parallel
for each of remote hospitals.
B. Data Format Inconsistencies
Since the studied legacy EHRs systems were autonomously
designed and implemented, a number of database inconsisten-
cies appeared at the time of implementation. The terminologies
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Fig. 4. System Usage Scenarios – Seeing a Doctor
used to represent the EHR data were not based on any standard
or common data format, which needed to be resolved first.
TABLE I provides an example of the database entries from
the three hospitals, though representing the same meanings,
but with different names. The right most column presents the
unified format agreed upon by the concerned authorities.
TABLE I
AN EXAMPLE OF UNIFIED DATA FORMAT
Attribute Name HC Format KW Format UH Format Unified Format
Patient identity card_id identitiy_id id patient_id
EHR identity record_id id_ehr eid ehr_id
Patient identity p_name patient_n pname patient_name
Name of the doctor d_name dotctor_n dname doctor_name
The unified EHR data format can significantly reduce
the number of data inconsistencies between different EHR
formats. Otherwise, each hospital requires a targeted data
conversion for each corresponding hospital. In our unified
EHR sharing scenario, each hospital only requires to conform
to a single negotiated data format. However, EHRs sharing
(independent of unified format) requires bidirectional data
conversion between two autonomous health care providers and
the number of conversions can be calculated by the formula
n(n− 1) if there are n hospitals. However, only n number of
conversions are needed in a unified EHR sharing. Although,
we currently have only three hospitals in the Macau EHRs
sharing case study, the network may grow well in the near
future and other health providers and research institutes may
take part in the data sharing process. In the future, the unified
data format will ease the merger of a new healthcare provider
into the MedShare. Note that the unified data sharing format
and the negotiation process was directly held by the admin-
istration of the hospitals. The HL7 format [4], OpenEHR [8]
standards, and other semantic models of EHRs [25][5] were
not under consideration during the negotiation process. Our
work in this research project was only confined to fill the
technological gaps.
IV. INTEROPERABLE ARCHITECTURE FOR SHARING
MEDICAL RESOURCES
This section introduces the architectural aspects of the
health information exchange system and elaborates on the
technical details encountered in the development of the system.
Our experience with developing a large system reveals that
interoperability is not only the issue to enable two autonomous
systems to exchange systems, but other non-technical factors
also play a vital role. In this regard, one of the challenges
lies in mediating the situation when autonomous health care
providers are not interested to share the data of their patient
cum customers and show a complete lack of interest in
transfering the data to their competitors. After presenting the
architectural details first, we will present a simple yet robust
solution to this problem.
A. MedShare Architecture
We employ the component diagram based on standardized
UML notation of Fig. 3 (a) to present MedShare Architecture.
The architecture has two views: 1) External view: this repre-
sents the foundational block of resource sharing approach that
allows for linking legacy EHR systems into a collaborative
sharing of their data. 2) Internal view: this describes the design
for the core components of the MedShare.
External View: The Figure 5 illustrates the external view of
our system. Legacy EHR systems provide the services of data
conversion to convert shared EHRs from a legacy system to
a distributed EHR system. However, using the authentication
service the doctor and the patient are authorized. By using
both services from the local legacy systems, the unified EHR
sharing system provides two services: 1) It allows to run
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a query on the MedShare. 2) The audit service handles
the privacy requirements of the system and post-breach data
analysis, which is not detailed in this paper.
Fig. 5. The External View of Distributed EHR Sharing Architecture
Internal View: The internal view of the unified EHR sharing
system in Fig. 6 shows how the sub-systems collaborate
to provide the required medical data querying mechanism
from the different hospitals. The subsystems use the services
provided by the index system in the data center to locate EHRs,
then using the service of transfer EHRs in each subsystem to
transfer all requested EHRs. To understand what is a service in
the system, readers are directed to the implementation section
of the paper.
Fig. 6. The Internal View of Distributed EHR Sharing Architecture
Patient Indexing: The patient indexing component stores all
the references of the shared EHRs to facilitate data queries
from the participating hospitals, i.e. requesters and providers.
A requester poses a data location query to the patient index
component without a direct connection with a peer hospital.
This is represented as 99K with a locate EHRs label and shows
the dependency between components in Fig. 6. The label
transfer EHRs provides access to the real data. The indexing
component stores only the unique reference for each shared
EHR, without any physical data relocation taking place from
the original source. This approach offers two main advantages:
1) huge data synchronization burden is alleviated and 2) cyber-
security attacks and other threats from the internal users are
minimized.
The HashMap technique is employed for patient indexing
that includes a relationship between a patient and the EHR
with the location. However, we leave it to the healthcare
providers to decide about the segments of data to be indexed.
Obviously, only the references are not enough. We need to
store in the indexing server some attributes of a shared EHR
that are not privacy-sensitive, as tags, along with the reference
to the EHRs. The indexing server is then able to respond
to queries based on these tags. Typically, the tags should
include the source location, the encoded patient number, the
date and time and the type of the EHRs. On the principle of
facilitating queries while complying privacy policies, it also
analyzes which set of tags is to be opened to the indexing
server may be pre-negotiated between stakeholders.
There are two main reasons not to use central storage for
patient data: 1) a hospital must push all the shared data into the
data center before EHR sharing if the data center stores all data
and 2) the local data should frequently be synchronized with
the indexing server. That will lead to a huge synchronization
burden to the data center because of enormous size of data.
For example, imagine the CT scan examination report that
may contain more than 1GB of data.
B. Data Query and Output Structure
As mentioned above, a data query includes two steps: 1)
locating an EHR, and 2) the data transfer procedure. An EHR
is located by a query, followed by the output. Hereunder,
we illustrate this by using an example, which further will
be detailed in the implementation section. Below, we provide
the query attributes that inlcudes patient identity, choosing the
range of dates, EHR type and which hospitals to query.
Input Parameters for Locating:
Hashed Patient ID Date Range EHR Type Hospitals
Output:
EHR ID EHR Type Date Location
Note that the retrieved ID in above is used to access a
particular EHR resource through Transfer EHR service as
shown in the Fig. 6.
Input Parameters for Transferring:
EHR ID EHR Type
The desired output is shown in a simplified way as follows.
The output shown below is integrated into the graphical user
interface of our toolset.
Output:
EHR Data
C. Ensuring Patient Privacy against Cyber Attacks
Our proposed technique introduces a two-way authentica-
tion process protecting the patient data from cyber-security
attacks. A doctor logins into the system, upon which the
patient is requested to scan her identity card. This two-way
authentication is enforced to take patient consent and protect
critical medical resources from outside attacks. In a worst
scenario, if the patient indexing server is compromised the
hashed patient identities are highly likely to remain protected.
The authentication process for doctors is implemented using
role-based access control. Note that access to medical data
records by a doctor requires laws and regulations to restrain
her from any type secondary usage of the data. Above all,
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all the operations in the resource sharing system are logged
to be able to investigate data breaches and perform auditing
services.
V. SYSTEM PROTOTYPING AND DEMONSTRATION
We have put forth a technique that allows for sharing
medical resource. In order to realize MedShare, we implement
our approach in four layers.
A. MedShare Implementation Stack
JWT
MongoDB
Spring MVC NodeJS
Locate 
Service
Data Access 
Service
Authentication 
Service
Query Shared EHRs Audit
Data Infrastructure 
Technical Frameworks
Discovery and Information Exchange Services
Front-end (Medical Resource Sharing)
Synchronization 
Service
Log 
Service
Fig. 7. Implementation Stack for the Medical Resource Sharing
Data Infrastructure Layer: The data infrastructure, as shown
in Fig. 7, shows the data storage based on MongoDB [1] which
is NoSQL database, more precisely a non-relational database.
To deal with the complexity of medical data, it requires to
have an adaptable format facilitating the data transformations
easily across multiple sources. This approach overcomes the
bottlenecks of traditional databases. Using MongoDB also
helps mutability and scalability features of EHRs.
Technical Framework Layer: All the components described
in our presented architectural models are implemented by the
lightweight Java EE framework Spring [10]. The required
two-way authentication service in the legacy EHR system is
implemented as a RESTFul web service by NodeJS [38] and
JSON Web Token (JWT) [14]. A RESTful service can be
defined as a means to hold query parameters. Contrary to
JavaEE, NodeJS has the advantage of utilizing low resources
to support high concurrency, which is good at scaling it
to industrial problems. While JWT is a compact, URL-safe
approach for representing claims between two communicating
ends. JWT provides foundational authentication service to
RESTful web services. Those two techniques guarantee the
reliability and safety of the authentication process.
Discovery and Information Exchange Services Layer: This
layer has three Spring MVC services and two web services
for authentication and synchronization. The LocateService,
which is implemented using Spring MVC framework, iden-
tifies the required EHR location from the patients indexed in
the MongoDB data infrastructure. The LocateService locates
the EHRs based on the search conditions and transmits it to
the doctor. The DataAccess is technically similar to Locate-
Service but functions differently. It retrieves relevant patient
data from the identified source. The AuthenticationService
provides the authorization service to the patient when the
doctor requests for a specific EHR. The authentication also
requires a service that integrates legacy EHR system into
the authentication process. The SynchronizationService timely
triggers the replication of the shared EHRs and updates the
indexes in the patient indexing server. The LogService provides
the log and tracking services to avoid data breach and trace
irregularities. The authentication component is deployed in all
the hospitals. The EHR query component is deployed in all the
hospitals to provide the data transmission service, and in the
patient indexing server to provide the locating service. The
SynchronizationService is deployed in all the hospitals and
the data center to replicate shared EHRs and update indexes.
The LogService is deployed on all servers because logs are
generated and stored in the patient indexing server and all the
other hospitals.
Front-end Medical Resource Sharing Layer: This layer
combines all the described layers and directly utilizes the
services available in the discovery and information exchange
services layer. Through this front-end the end user poses a
query to the shared EHRs resources and retrieves a list of
resources against the targeted EHR. The Audit service holds
the system users accountable for their action in the system.
More precisely, the doctor can distributively retrieve all the
relevant records of the patient among all the hospitals while
preserving patient privacy.
B. Evaluation
We deploy our prototype system in four different servers
named HC, KW, UH, and PI (Patient Indexing). The EHR
data are retrieved from hemodialysis center of Kiang Wu
hospital, and then also generated extensive testing data for
other two hospitals. In our testing scenario, we have 10,000
hemodialysis data of 100 patients. After accessing the shared
data of these 100 patients with the different date range,
MedShare worked as desired. Furthermore, all shared data was
successfully recorded by logging the data access requests and
their providers.
Let us assume that a doctor in HC hospital requests all the
hemodialysis records of a patient named Yang Yingying. This
scenario is demonstrated by the Fig. 8 that shows a list of all
the hemodialysis records of Yang Yingying that may further
be individually viewed by the doctor by clicking the Details
link.
From the retrieved list of medical records, as given in
Fig. 8, a doctor can fetch the detailed record against any
displayed link. For example, the EHR corresponding to Sep
30, 2015, as shown in Fig. 9. The detailed output includes
two types of information: 1) the patient information, and 2)
her hemodialysis record.
In order to be able to track the accessed data, MedShare
supports the administrator to track the logs and investigate
the specific operations performed by the users on a patient
record. For example, when the tracker needs to know the
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Locating Query Parameters:
Query Result:
Fig. 8. A screenshot of the Query Execution Environment to Locate a
Resource
Patient Basic 
Information
Hemodialysis Record
Fig. 9. A detailed Hemodialysis Report
accessing information about the EHR with ID 0221, the
tracking system is able to show all the relevant results between
two dates, as demonstrated in Figure 10. The prototype shows
that the proposed architecture can deal with the sharing tasks
of the hemodialysis EHRs among the Macau hospitals without
compromising the privacy requirements.
Auditing access to a medical resouce
Query Parameters
Result
Fig. 10. Auditing access to a medical resource
The distributed resour -sharing nvironment can be scaled
up to include a significantly large number of medical health
providers. However, in that case robust testing is proposed.
Our resource sharing toolset lets its stakeholders to retain their
data, which is otherwise a primary concern for a participating
stakeholder. MedShare provides a transparent platform by
integrating legacy EHR systems that were developed different
implementation techniques. To maintained the openness of the
system, the participants chose their own interoperable data
format through negotiations which may however be replaced
with open standards such as HL7 and openEHR. From another
technical perspective, we also need an in-depth analysis of data
storage strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
We presented a set of implementation guidelines for ex-
changing medical resources among autonomous healthcare
providers. We negotiated a common data structure that sets
forth the first step to allows for interoperability among the
three disconnected hospitals in Macau. Applying standardized
data formats, such as HL7, was a daunting task because of
bilingual patient data storage in both English and Chinese.
MedShare ensured that participating healthcare providers have
confidence in the system through their primary control over
patient data. Our work endorses the fact that the exchange of
medical information between independent hospitals is not only
limited to technical issues but economic and political issues
are equally important.
Our experience with developing interoperable systems ad-
vocates a gradual replacement of legacy EHRs systems. Med-
Share preserves patient privacy by two-way authentication
process that collects patient consent before any data autho-
rization is made. To integrate patient consent into a data-
sharing scenario, our system takes the advantage of national
identification cards that are swiped by the patients during
their medical visits. All patients in a hospital are uniquely
identified by their identity numbers, which are hashed in the
data indexing process. The patient indexing technique enables
a more secure data exchange environment and develops a sense
of safe cooperation between hospitals.
Our future work includes developing an intense auditing
process over shared medical data. To this end, we also aim
to study potential attacks on the deployed system. In data
sharing scenarios where multiple languages are used to store,
process and communicate data, language-dependent and uni-
fied data formats are not directly applicable. This necessitates
an additional work to tackle interoperable systems using two
or more languages. Thereby, both syntax and semantics play
an important role to develop such system. We aim to increase
the number of hospitals in our interoperable resource sharing
network. We also plan to report our findings based on the
scalability and openness of the system. Robust evaluation
studies are needed to evaluate non-functional aspects of such
systems including scalability, heterogeneity, resource manage-
ment, transparency, openness and performance analysis.
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